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In many security markets, market-makers o®er o®er to trade at a discount relative to their
posted bid and ask quotes. In this article we provide an explanation to this phenomenon.
We show that market-makers can mitigate informational asymmetries by selectively of-
fering price improvements to their regular clients. We study a speci¯c type of pricing
strategy which consists (a) in o®ering price improvements to investors who have not re-
peatedly in°icted trading losses to the marker-maker and (b) in temporarily suspending
these discounts otherwise. We ¯nd that when a market-maker uses this pricing strategy,
there are equilibria in which his clients optimally choose not to contact him when they
have private information. These equilibria Pareto-dominate those which are obtained when
the market-maker does not or can not make his quotes contingent on his clients' trading
histories. Our model predicts that (1) market-makers should grant price improvements
to their regular clients but that (2) these improvements should be temporarily suspended
after sequences of purchases (sales) followed by price increases (decreases).
Keywords: Market Microstructure, Price Improvements, Market Design.Price Improvements in Financial Markets as a Screening Device
1 Introduction
In most market microstructure models, traders interact anonymously and quotes only de-
pend on the current order °ow. This view of the trading process is not adequate for all
market structures. In many trading systems (e.g. the London Stock Exchange), investors
have the possibility to negotiate one-to-one with a dealer and to forge long-term trading
relationships.1 What are the bene¯ts of these trading venues relative to more anonymous
marketplaces? The common wisdom is that long-term trading relationships enable deal-
ers to screen informed investors and non-informed investors. Hence they mitigate adverse
selection problems. In this way trading costs are reduced for non-informed investors.2 Sur-
prisingly, the speci¯c mechanism by which dealers screen their customers has not received
much attention. The purpose of this paper is to study this mechanism.
More speci¯cally we show that a dealer can induce his regular clients to only conduct
non-informed trades by granting or denying price discounts to these clients, depending on
their trading history. The fear of losing future price improvements disciplines the dealer's
clients. In reality, market-makers sometimes o®er to trade at a discount relative to their
posted bid and ask prices (a practice which is referred to as `price improvement').3 Our
analysis o®ers an explanation to this practice. It also shows that an investor's trading
history can be an important determinant of her trading costs. In our model dealers are
unable to directly observe their clients' trading motives, at the time of a trade and after
completion of this trade. Hence their decision to concede price improvements can only
depend on the transactions data they accumulate with each investor. We identify the
sequences of transactions after which a dealer should stop o®ering price improvements (at
least for a while) to a speci¯c client. Thus the model predicts how the pattern of price
improvements received by an investor relates to her trading history.
We model long-term trading relationships between an investor and her `regular' dealer as
1Other prominent examples include the Nasdaq or the upstairs market in the NYSE.
2For instance, Madhavan and Cheng (1997) compare the trading costs in the upstairs and the downstairs
markets on the NYSE. They ¯nd smaller trading costs in the upstairs markets (after controlling for trade
size). They argue (and show empirically) that this ¯nding re°ects the traders' ability, in the upstairs
markets, to signal that their trades are not based on private information.
3Price improvements on the London Stock Exchange or on the Nasdaq have been documented by Reiss
and Werner (1993) and Huang and Stoll (1996), respectively. For instance Huang and Stoll (1996) ¯nd
that 45;1% of the large trades receive price improvements on Nasdaq. Price improvements have also been
documented for °oor markets such as the NYSE and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (see Petersen and
Fialkowski (1994) and Theissen (2000)).
1a repeated game. In each period, the investor either receives private information regarding
the value of a risky security or she su®ers an endowment shock that can be hedged with
this security. The investor must then decide whether to trade with her regular dealer or
not. If he is contacted, the dealer selects one of two prices, a `good' price or a `bad' price,
depending on the investor's track record. The good price improves upon the price that the
investor could obtain without patronizing the dealer. The bad price does not o®er such an
improvement. It is charged when the investor's track record is such that her trades have
repeatedly in°icted losses to the dealer, that is after a sequence of purchases followed by
price increases or sales followed by price decreases (`suspicious trades').4
This type of pricing policy confronts the investor with the following dilemma when
she possesses private information. If she exploits her information by trading against her
regular dealer, she earns a large return but she increases the likelihood that she will be
denied price improvements in the future. This will increase her hedging costs when she
trades for risk sharing. Thus the investor impairs the value of the ongoing relationship
with her regular dealer if she rips him o®. If she refrains from trading, the investor loses
a pro¯table trading opportunity but she maintains their relationship in `good stand'. To
sum up, the investor trades o® the loss in the value of her relationship with the dealer with
the immediate gain from informed trading.
We delineate the set of parameters for which the investor is better o® not trading with
her regular dealer when she is informed. For these parameters, there exist `cooperative'
equilibria in which the dealer establishes a virtuous relationship with the investor. The
latter does not trade with her relationship dealer when she has information in order to
secure future price improvements. In turn, o®ering price improvements is a viable pricing
policy for the dealer since the investor does not conduct informed trades. Furthermore,
price improvements reduce the investor's hedging costs. Accordingly, the allocation of
risk between the investor and her regular dealer is more e±cient in cooperative equilibria.
Hence the dealer's pricing policy results in a welfare gain for the two parties.
Without the prospect of losing future price improvements (e.g. with short term trading
relationships), the investor can not be deterred from using her private information. This
creates an adverse selection problem which increases the cost of hedging and which reduces
the extent of risk sharing. For some investors (those with a high probability of being
informed) the cost of hedging is so high that it is optimal for them not to trade (a form
4There are anecdotal evidences that dealers use pricing strategies which depend on the pro¯tability of
their past transactions with a given client. For instance, Smith (1985) describes the dealers' behavior in
the upstairs market as follows: `Dealers try to keep track of who bags them [...]. They try to maintain a
ratio of $6 in commissions for every $1 in trading losses generated by a speci¯c customer. [...] if the ratio
drops to 3-to-1, someone from the ¯rm may have to chat with the customer'.
2of market breakdown). Interestingly we ¯nd that there always exist cooperative equilibria
in which these investors do trade. This vindicates the claim that trading venues in which
investors can develop long-term relationships facilitate trades that could not otherwise
occur.5
The dealer's pricing strategy is not contingent on the investor's `true' trading motive
which can not be observed. Rather it depends on each client's trading history (their past
trades and the price movements following these trades). In particular, a penalty phase (a
phase without price improvements) is triggered by a sequence of suspicious trades. These
trades have a larger likelihood if the investor rips o® her regular dealer but they may
also be observed if she does not. An implication is that penalty phases will sometimes
occur in equilibrium. Hence our model predicts that, other things equal, there should be
oscillations in the price improvement received by a given trader. Furthermore, for a given
investor, the switch from `good' to `bad' prices should occur after a sequence of suspicious
trades.
Two recent papers (Rhodes-Kropf (1998) and Bernhardt et al.(1999)) have also pro-
vided theories which explain price improvements. Rhodes-Kropf (1998) considers a static
model in which dealers post non-competitive prices. Hence they can o®er price improve-
ments, without making losses, to those traders who negotiate trades. The fraction of
investors with the ability to negotiate trades and their bargaining power are assumed to
be exogenous. Bernhardt et al.(1999) endogenizes these assumptions by considering re-
peated relationships between a dealer and his clients. Their central result is that more
regular traders obtain larger price improvements. In contrast with these two papers, our
explanation for price improvements does not rely on dealers earning excess pro¯ts. In the
present article price improvements constitute the key element of an incentive mechanism.
Furthermore asymmetric information is a crucial ingredient of our model whereas it is not
in Rhodes-Kropf (1998) and Bernhardt et al.(1999).6
A main prediction of Bernhardt et al.(1999) is that price improvements should be pos-
itively correlated with trade sizes.7 In our setting, the investor trades in larger size when
she obtains a price improvement. Thus, our model would also predict a positive correla-
tion between trade sizes and price improvements. The prediction that price improvements,
for a given trader, should oscillate over time is unique to our model, however. A test of
5For instance, Madhavan (2000), page 31, notices that `The upstairs market major role may be to
enable transactions that would not otherwise occur in the downstairs market'.
6In Bernhard et al. (1999), investors and dealers have symmetric information. Rhodes-Kropf (1998)
considers the case of asymmetric information but he assumes that informed investors can not negotiate
price improvements.
7This positive correlation is indeed observed on the London Stock Exchange. See Reiss and Werner
(1993).
3this prediction could therefore be used to distinguish empirically our explanation for price
improvements from previous explanations.
Benveniste, Marcus and Wilhelm (1992) consider a static model in which a dealer (the
NYSE specialist) has the ability to sanction (ex-post) brokers who disguise their trading
motives.8 In this case, they ¯nd that there is an equilibrium in which the specialist can
price discriminate between informed and non-informed traders. In contrast, we make the
realistic assumption that a dealer cannot verify his clients' alleged trading motives.9 We
show that this imperfect observation of the trading motive restricts the set of traders for
which cooperative equilibria can be sustained. The intuition is as follows. As we already
explained, penalty phases must necessarily occur in equilibrium. If penalty phases occur
too frequently, the value of maintaining the relationship in good stand becomes small
compared to the one shot gain an informed investor can obtain by ripping her dealer o®.
In such cases, it is impossible to sustain cooperative equilibria. Interestingly, the existence
of these equilibria depend on traders' characteristics, such as their risk aversion and their
probability of being informed. Counter-intuitively, we ¯nd that cooperative equilibria are
easier to sustain when investors have a high probability of being informed. They also bring
relatively larger welfare gains to these investors.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the model. Section
3 analyzes the benchmark case of short-term trading relationships. Section 4 considers the
case in which the dealer and the investor are engaged in long-term trading relationships.
Section 5 discusses the robustness of the results and the implications of the model. Section
6 concludes. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
The investor
We consider a risk averse investor and a risk neutral dealer (henceforth the relation-
ship or regular dealer) who are engaged in long-term trading relationships. The investor
can be thought as an institution. On the Nasdaq for instance, institutional investors di-
rectly engage in long-term relationships with dealers and in fact receive the bulk of price
8Seppi (1990) is another related paper. See Section 6 for a discussion.
9In our model, there are no observations (trading histories) which can occur only if the investor mis-
behaves. Benveniste et al. (1992) implicitly assumes that such observations exist. In fact our analysis is
related to models of repeated games in which players' actions are imperfectly observed (see e.g. Green
and Porter (1984), Radner (1985) and Abreu et al. (1990)). To our knowledge, this literature has not
addressed yet the case in which the repetition of the interactions between two players can be used to solve
an adverse selection problem, as it is the case in this paper.
4improvements for large orders (see Huang and Stoll (1996) and Smith et al. (1998)).
The investor may contact her relationship dealer when she has an opportunity to trade a
risky security, either because she has private information on the value of the security or be-
cause she needs to hedge. These trading opportunities arise at dates 0;1;2;:::t;:::;ad inf.
We call a `period', the interval of time between two dates. At the end of each period,
the risky security is worth ~ v1 = v0 + ~ ² where ² = +1 or ² = ¡1 with probabilities
¼U = ¼D =
¹
2 > 0 or ² = 0 with probability ¼0 = 1 ¡ ¹.10 The parameter ¹ mea-
sures the asset volatility since Var(~ v1) = ¹. The investor can also invest in a riskless asset.
The (intra period) risk free rate is set to zero, for simplicity.
At the beginning of each period, with probability ® > 0, the investor receives perfect
information on the ¯nal value of the security. With probability (1¡®), the investor has no
private information but she receives a risky endowment which has a payo® ~ z, at the end of
the period. This payo® is ~ z = ~ h~ ² where ~ h = +Q or ~ h = ¡Q with equal probabilities. The
security can be used to hedge the risky endowment. If h is positive (negative) the investor
must sell the security in order to reduce her risk exposure and she is perfectly hedged if
she sells (buys) Q shares. The investor privately learns the direction of her hedging need
(h) at the beginning of each period. In all the cases, we assume that the investor starts
each period with a constant endowment in the riskless asset, which is normalized to zero
(without a®ecting the results).
After learning the direction of the hedging need or receiving information, the investor
can trade the risky security so as to maximize the expected utility of her end of period
consumption.11 The investor has a concave utility function, which is
U(W) = °W for W > 0;
U(W) = W for W < 0:
with ° 2 (0;1). Notice that the lower is °, the larger is the investor's risk aversion.12
To sum up, in each period, the investor may trade either to hedge or to bene¯t from
her private information.13 More precisely she has one of the ¯ve following types or trading
motives
10Notice that E(v1) = v0. We could assume that the expected liquidation value varies across periods,
without altering any of the results.
11This means that the investor entirely consumes her wealth at the end of each period.
12Dow (1998) uses a similar speci¯cation for investors' preferences.
13Notice that we exclude the case in which the investor would have both information and hedging needs.
As argued in Seppi (1990), this case is not likely to occur in practice.
51. Positive hedging need, µ1.
2. Negative hedging need, µ2.
3. Informed that ² = ¡1, µ3.
4. Informed that ² = +1, µ4.
5. Informed that ² = 0, µ5.
The investor's trading motive is privately observed by the investor and statements regarding
this motive can not be veri¯ed.
The trading process
Once she knows her type, the investor decides to trade or not with her regular dealer.
We model the trading process as a two stages game (the `trading game').
In the ¯rst stage, the investor chooses the direction and the size of her trade. We
denote by q the investor's order with the convention that q > 0 (q < 0) if the investor
buys (sells) the security. If q = 0 then the investor chooses to abstain from contacting her
relationship dealer. The investor's trading strategy, q(µ;H), depends on her type and her
trading history (H) with the dealer. If the dealer is contacted by the investor, he makes an
o®er, that is a price p at which he is willing to accommodate the investor's order. We refer
to p(q;H) as the dealer's bidding rule. The dealer's o®er depends on her belief regarding
the investor's type. We denote by Á(q;H) the dealer's posterior probability distribution
for the investor's type when she chooses to trade q and their trading history is H.
The trading game has similarities with Glosten and Milgrom (1985)'s model. There are
two signi¯cant di®erences, however. First the investor's trade size is endogenous. Second,
the price charged to the investor can depend on her trading history. This requires trading
to be non-anonymous. These two features play an important role in our analysis.
Following Glosten and Milgrom (1985), weassume that the dealer behaves competitively.
This means that in each period, the dealer's price is set so that her expected pro¯t is zero
or
p(q;H) = E(~ v j q;H); 8q;8H:
Furthermore, for the moment, we assume that the investor only trades with her relationship
dealer. In Section 6 we discuss how the model generalizes when these assumptions are
relaxed. Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of events in each period.
6The cooperative trading strategy
In a given period, we say that the investor behaves in a cooperative way if she abstains
from contacting her regular dealer when she is informed. In this case, the dealer's quote
is equal to the unconditional expected value of the security and the investor buys or sells
Q shares depending on the direction of her hedging need. Hence risk sharing between
the investor and the dealer is Pareto-optimal (recall that the dealer is risk-neutral). The






qc(µ;H) = 0 8µ 2 fµ3;µ4;µ5g:
(1)
Our analysis identi¯es conditions under which the investor can be induced to behave co-
operatively.
3 Short-Term Trading Relationships
In this section, we analyze the special case in which the dealer and the investor are not
engaged in long-term trading relationships: they do not plan to meet again and they have
no common trading history. We start by considering (a) the case in which the investor
can not commit on a trading strategy and (b) the case in which she can. The results
provide useful benchmarks to assess the role of long-term trading relationships. They are
also building blocks to solve for the equilibria in this case.
3.1 The equilibria with short-term trading relationships
We focus on trading strategies and bidding strategies that form a Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium (PBE) of the trading game.14 A PBE is a vector (q¤(:);p¤(:);Á¤(:)) such that
1. The trading strategy q¤(:) maximizes the investor's expected utility given the dealer's
bidding rule, p¤(:).
2. The bidding rule p¤(:) is competitive.
3. The dealer's posterior belief Á¤(:) is derived from the investor's trading strategy using
Bayes rule where possible.
14This is the relevant equilibrium concept since the trading game is a signaling game. We just consider
equilibria in pure strategies.
7Suppose that the dealer believes that the investor acts cooperatively. In this case, he is
willing to trade at a price equal to the security unconditional expected value. Now suppose
that the investor receives bad information. If she is cooperative, she does not trade (a zero
expected utility). Instead she can sell Q shares at price v0 (and she obtains a utility equal
to °Q > 0). Therefore the investor is better o® behaving non-cooperatively. Hence, with
short-term trading relationships, there is no equilibrium in which the investor uses the
cooperative trading strategy. We now analyze the equilibria which arise with short-term
trading relationships. Let snc def =
®¹
¹®+(1¡®).
Lemma 1 : All the equilibria of the trading game have the following properties:
² The investor buys the same amount, qbuy, of the security when she has type µ2 or µ4,
i.e. q¤(µ) = qbuy ¸ 0 if µ 2 fµ2;µ4g:
² The investor sells the same amount, qsell, of the security when she has type µ3 or µ4,
i.e. q¤(µ) = ¡qsell · 0 if µ 2 fµ1;µ3g:
² The investor does not trade when she knows that there will be no change in the asset
value, i.e. q¤(µ5) = 0.
² In the equilibria for which qbuy > 0, the dealer charges a price equal to p(qbuy) =
v0 + snc when he receives the equilibrium buy order. In the equilibria for which
qsell > 0 the dealer charges a price equal to p(¡qsell) = v0 ¡snc when he receives the
equilibrium sell order.
In line with intuition, the investor with type µ1 (µ2) sells (buys) the security in order to
decrease her risk exposure. In order to avoid detection, an informed investor with bad
(good) information mimics the behavior of an investor with type µ1 by selling the same
quantity. This creates adverse selection. In order to break-even, the dealer must price the
security at a discount (a markup) relative to the security unconditional expected value
when the investor chooses to sell (buy) the security. This wedge, snc, can be interpreted
as the `spread' charged by the dealer. If the investor is informed that the innovation in
the asset value is zero, she is left with no better choice than not trading. The investor's
trade size may vary across equilibria (see the discussion below). However, the ask and bid
prices posted by the dealer are always the same.
Proposition 1 : When ° ¸ ¹ °(®;¹), the unique equilibrium of the trading game is such
that the investor never contacts the dealer, i.e. q¤(µ) = 0; 8µ, with ¹ °(®;¹) =
1¡3®+2¹®
2®¹+(1¡®):
8Notice that ¹ ° decreases with ® and that it increases with ¹. This means that there is
no risk sharing at all between the investor and the dealer when (i) the probability of an
informed trade is large or (ii) the investor's hedging need is weak because the asset is not
very volatile or she is not very risk averse (¹ small or ° large). In these cases, the utility
gain to hedging is small compared to the cost of hedging and the investor is better o® not
trading. This no trading outcome is a form of market breakdown.15 The next corollary









Corollary 1 : For a given risk aversion ° and a given probability ®, a market breakdown
occurs i® ¹ · ¹nc(®;°).
Figure 2 illustrates the corollary. Notice that as ° increases, the curve which separates
the two areas (trading/no trading) shifts to the left. This means that the set of values for
parameters (®;¹) such that there is no market breakdown becomes smaller and smaller
when the investor's risk aversion decreases. Notice also that for a given risk aversion, there
always exists a value of ® su±ciently low for trading to be a possible equilibrium outcome.






The next proposition shows that the trading game has an equilibrium in which the investor
trades an amount equal to qnc. It also claims that this trading strategy yields the largest
possible ex-ante expected utility to the investor.
Proposition 2 : When ° < ¹ °(®;¹), the trading game has an equilibrium in which the








nc) = v0 + s
nc;
p
nc(¡q) = v0 ¡1 8q 6 = q
nc;q > 0;
p
nc(q) = v0 + 1 8q 6 = q
nc;q > 0:
The allocation of risks in this equilibrium Pareto-dominates ex-ante all the other possible
equilibrium allocations in the equilibria with zero expected pro¯ts for the dealer.
15There are other models (e.g. Madhavan (1992)) in which a market breakdown arises when the prob-
ability of informed trading is too large or when the hedgers' risk-aversion is too small. However in these
models a market breakdown designates a situation in which there are no equilibria. In our model, it refers
to a situation in which the equilibrium exists but it features no trading.
9When ° < ¹ °, the trading game has multiple equilibria. As usual in signaling games, this
re°ects the absence of restrictions imposed by the PBE concept on the dealer's beliefs, Á¤,
for trade sizes out-of-the equilibrium path. Among all the equilibria which yields a zero
expected pro¯t to the dealer, the investor's ex-ante expected utility is the largest in the
equilibrium described in Proposition 2. The intuition for this result is that qnc is the trade
size which maximizes the investor's expected utility when (a) she is uninformed and (b)
the dealer o®ers to sell (or buy) the security at price v0 + snc (or v0 ¡ snc).
Since the equilibriumdescribed in Proposition 2 is the preferred outcomefor the investor,
we assume that this is the equilibrium on which the investor and the dealer settles with
short term trading relationships. Hence in what follows we take the investor's welfare
in this equilibrium as our benchmark to assess the welfare gains that can be achieved
with long-term trading relationships (we denote qnc(:) the investor's trading strategy in
this case). Notice that in equilibrium, the investor does not perfectly hedge her risky
endowment (qnc < Q) if ® > 0. Actually, in this case, hedging is costly since the dealer
sells (buys) the security at a markup (discount), snc.
3.2 The `no informed trading' commitment
Informed trading is a double-edged sword for the investor. On the one hand, informed
trading is a source of pro¯t at the expense of the dealer. On the other hand, it prevents
the investor from hedging perfectly. On balance, the welfare loss due to imperfect hedging
always more than compensates the welfare gain from informed trading. For this reason the
investor would like to commit ex-ante (before learning her type) to follow the cooperative
trading strategy, that is to refrain from trading when she is informed (for ® 2 (0;1)). We
refer to this commitment as the `no informed trading commitment'.
Let ¢Uc(®;¹;°) be the di®erence between the ex-ante investor's expected utility with













where ¹ U(q(µ)) is the investor's expected utility when she uses the trading strategy q(:) and
her type is µ. The value of ¢Uc measures the welfare gain generated by a `no informed
trading' commitment.
If the investor is informed and does not trade, she does not improve upon her reservation
utility which is zero. If she can perfectly hedge at zero cost (zero spread), she reaches an
expected utility level equal to zero. Hence ¹ U(qc(µ)) = 0;8µ. We obtain the following
10result.










®(1 ¡ ®)¹(1 ¡ °)
2¹® + (1 ¡®)
!









(1 ¡ ®)¹(1 ¡ °)
2
!
Q if ° ¸ ¹ °(®;¹):
In line with intuition, the welfare gain obtained with a `no informed trading' commitment
is greater when the hedging need is large, that is when the investor's risk aversion is large
or when the asset volatility (¹) is large. The welfare gain is not necessarily monotonic
in the probability of informed trading. Actually, when the investor is most of the time
uninformed (® small), the spread is small and the welfare loss (in absence of commitment)
is small. When the investor is informed very often, the spread is large and the welfare loss
is large when the investor has a hedging need. But ex-ante, the probability of a hedging
need is small. It follows that the expected welfare loss is small.
4 Long Term Trading Relationships
In the previous section, we have established that the investor would like to promise that
she will not trade if she receives private information. But, with short-term trading rela-
tionships, this promise is not credible. In this section, we analyze the case of long-term
relationships. In this case, the investor can be induced to refrain from trading when she is
informed.16
We assume that each encounter between the investor and her relationship dealer has
the probability (1¡¯) to be the last. Larger ¯s' are associated with relationships that are
expected to last longer.17 Let q = fq0;q1;:::;q¿;::::g be the sequence of trading strategies
used by the investor. For such a sequence, the investor's expected payo® at date ¿ is




tE(¹ U(qn(~ µn; ~ Hn)) j µ¿;H¿): (2)
16Admati and P°eiderer (1991) consider a model in which uninformed traders can pre-announce the size
of their trades (a practice called `sunshine trading'.) They assume that informed investors can not make
similar pre announcements or that they can commit not to make these announcements. In the present
article, we explicitly analyze how to enforce this type of commitment.
17When they meet, the traders expect their relationship to last for 1
(1¡¯) periods. The case of short-term
trading relationships corresponds to ¯ = 0.
11At each date, the investor chooses her trading strategy so as to maximize the value of her
trading relationship, V(:).
After each encounter, the traders' common trading history is enriched by the investor's
trade and the innovation in the asset value, that is the pair y = (q;²). Thus their common
trading history after ¿ encounters is
H¿ = fy0;:::;yk;:::;y¿¡1g:
We denote p = fp0(:;:);p1(:;:);:::;p¿(:;:);:::g the sequence of bidding rules used by the
dealer.
We focus our attention on perfect equilibria of the repeated game. A perfect equilibrium
is a sequence q¤ of trading strategies and a sequence p¤ of bidding rules such that from any
date ¿ and given any trading history H¿, (a) the sequence of trading strategies from date
¿ onward (i.e. fq¤
¿;q¤
¿+1;:::g), maximizes the investor's expected payo®, (b) the bidding
rule at each date is competitive and (c) the dealer's posterior belief at date ¿, Á¤
¿(q¿;H¿),
is derived from the investor's trading strategy at this date using Bayes rule where possible.
Notice that in each stage, we employ the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium concept.
The equilibrium described in Proposition 2 remains an equilibrium (as usual in repeated
games). However, we show below that a Pareto improvement is possible if the traders
use strategies that are history dependent. We proceed in two steps. We ¯rst de¯ne a
speci¯c class of strategies that are history dependent and which involve price improvements
(`scoring strategies'). Then we identify the conditions under which these strategies form a
perfect equilibrium.
4.1 Scoring Strategies
Consider the following strategies for the traders. In each period, the relationship between
the investor and the dealer can be in one of two phases: (1) a cooperative phase or (2) a
non cooperative phase. In a cooperative phase, the traders behave as when the investor can
credibly adhere to a `no informed trading' commitment. Thus, the investor conforms to the
cooperative trading strategy (qc(:)) in each period and therefore the dealer charges a price
equal to the security unconditional expected value (see Section 3). In a non cooperative
phase the traders behave as in the equilibrium with short-term relationships, described in
Proposition 2 (that is q(:) = qnc(:) and the dealer follows the bidding strategy pnc).18 With
18Notice that if ° ¸ ¹ °, there is no trading between the dealer and the investor during the non cooperative
phase.
12a description of the events which trigger a switch from one phase to the other (see below),
this de¯nes the sequence of bidding rules, pl, and trading strategies, ql, used by the dealer
and the investor, respectively.
Notice that the spread has two possible sizes: a `small' size (equal to zero here) that
is charged during the cooperative phase and a `large' size (equal to snc) that is charged
during the non cooperative phase. Hence, in cooperative phases, the investor receives price
improvements compared to non cooperative phases. Initially (at date ¿ = 0), the traders
cooperate. We now describe the events which trigger a switch to a non cooperative phase.
In the cooperative phase, after each encounter, the dealer assigns a `score', S ¸ 0, to
the investor. This score depends on the pro¯tability of the trades he conducts with her.
The dealer loses money when the investor sells the asset and subsequently the asset price
decreases (y = (¡Q;¡1)) or when the investor buys the asset and subsequently the asset
price increases (y = (+Q;+1)). For these trades, the dealer increments the investor's
score by 1. In all the other cases, the dealer earns money, except when the security value
is unchanged, in which case the dealer just breaks even. When the dealer earns money
(y = (¡Q;+1) or y = (+Q;¡1)), he reinstates the investor's score at zero. When the
dealer just breaks even or when there is no trade, the investor's score is unchanged.19 The
dealer stops o®ering price improvements when the score reaches a speci¯c threshold, S¤.
Then the traders enter a non cooperative phase that lasts T ¸ 1 periods. After this penalty
phase, cooperation is restored and the dealer starts o®ering price improvements anew.
When the dealer chooses his prices as we just described, we say that he follows a scoring
strategy. A scoring strategy is characterized by two parameters: (i) the `trigger value' of
the score (S¤) and (ii) the length of the non cooperative phase (T). Scoring strategies
formalize the idea that dealers should keep track of the pro¯tability of the trades they
conduct with a particular client and o®er good prices to those clients who do not repeatedly
generate losses. Of course, there are other ways to specify the evolution of the score after
a transaction. We discuss this point in Section 6.
The dealer's pricing strategy can be seen as an incentive scheme (a `contract') set-up by
the dealer.20 Let Probc(y) (resp. Probnc(y)) be the probability of observing the outcome y
at the end of a trading period if the investor behaves cooperatively (non-cooperatively).21
Let r(y) = Probnc(y)=Probc(y) be the associated likelihood ratio. The dealer increments
the investor's score by one unit after outcomes which have a likelihood ratio larger than
19More generally if the dealer were to expect a strictly positive expected pro¯t, he would assign a score
to the investor by comparing his realized pro¯t to the expected pro¯t. The score would be increased by
one (restored at zero) when the realized pro¯t is smaller (larger) than the expected pro¯t.
20Cooperation is the action that the dealer tries to implement with this contract.
21These probabilities are conditional on a trade taking place.
13one, that is outcomes which are more likely if the investor does not behave cooperatively.
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which is always larger than one. The same result holds for y = (+Q;+1). For all the other
outcomes the likelihood ratio is less than one. In line with intuition trading losses are more
likely to be incurred when the investor does not behave cooperatively than when she does.
In contrast, trading pro¯ts are more frequent when the investor behaves cooperatively.
Hence, in order to incentivize the investor, the dealer must `punish' her after a sequence
of trading losses and `reward' her when her trades are pro¯table for the dealer. This is
exactly what is achieved by a scoring strategy.22
Notice that the likelihood ratio decreases with ¹ and increases with ®. This means
that the statistical test on which the incentive scheme is based is less conclusive when the
volatility of the asset is large or when the investor has a small probability of being informed.
Consider ¹ ¯rst. When the probability of large price movements is high, the probability of
a trading loss for the dealer is large, be the investor informed or not.23 Therefore a trading
loss is less indicative of the investor being informed. When ® is small, the probability of
a trading loss is not signi¯cantly larger when the investor does not cooperate because in
most of the trades the investor is non-informed. Thus when ¹ is large and/or ® is small,
we expect scoring strategies to be less e®ective in disciplining the investor.
Our interpretation so far has emphasized the link between a scoring strategy and an
incentive contract between the dealer and the investor. It is worth stressing however
that our analysis does not rely on explicit and binding contracts. Rather, in equilibrium,
the course of actions prescribed by scoring strategies must be self-enforcing, for both the
dealer and the investor. In the next section, we show that there are parameters' values for
which this is the case, that is parameters values for which strategies (pl;ql) form a perfect
equilibrium. We call such an equilibrium a cooperative equilibrium.
Remark. It is important to stress that the trading history up to date ¿ does not provide
22When the dealer trades at a pro¯t, he rewards the investor by assigning her a score equal to zero.
23The probability of a trading loss conditional on the investor being non-informed (resp. informed) is
¹=2 (resp. 1).
14information on the investor's trading motives in the forthcoming periods. Actually, there is
no persistence in these motives from one period to the next in our model. Hence Bayesian
learning of the trading motive is impossible. The dealer's prices are contingent on his
trading history with the investor because this disciplines the investor, not because the
history contains information on the investor's type.
4.2 Equilibria with Scoring Strategies
We now show that there are values of the parameters for which the bidding strategy, pl,
and the trading strategy, ql, are self-enforcing. Consider non cooperative phases, ¯rst. In
this case, the dealer anticipates that the investor will misbehave. Hence, the dealer must
quote `bad' execution prices (follow the pricing strategy pnc(:)) in order to break-even.
In turn, the investor has no incentive to refrain from trading when she is informed since
the dealer's future prices are independent of her transaction in this round. It is therefore
optimal for the investor to behave as described in Proposition 2.
Now consider cooperative phases. The dealer expects the investor to refrain from trading
when she is informed. Hence the dealer's competitive pricing policy consists in o®ering
a price equal to v0. It remains to identify conditions under which it is optimal for the
investor to refrain from trading when she is informed. To this end we introduce the
following notations.
Let V(in;S) be the investor's expected payo®, in a cooperative phase, when the investor
is informed and her score is equal to S · S¤ ¡ 1.24 In the same way, let V(he;S) be the
investor's expected payo®, in a cooperative phase, when she has a hedging need. Hence,
the ex-ante investor's expected payo® in a cooperative phase is
V(S) = ®V(in;S) + (1 ¡ ®)V(he;S) for S · S
¤ ¡ 1: (3)
In a cooperative phase, when the investor is informed, she refrains from trading with her
relationship dealer. She misses a pro¯t opportunity but she maintains her score unchanged.
Therefore,
V(in;S) = ¯V (S) for S · S
¤ ¡ 1: (4)
Now consider the case in which the investor needs to hedge. In the cooperative phase, she
hedges perfectly. In this case she obtains a zero per period expected utility (instead of a
negative expected utility). Her score may deteriorate, however. This occurs if the outcome
24All the value functions V (:) depend on S¤ and T. We dropped these arguments to simplify the
notations. Furthermore the value functions do not depend on the direction of the signal received by the
investor or the direction of her hedging need because of the model symmetry.
15y belongs to f(¡Q;¡1);(+Q;+1)g. The probability of this event is
¹
2. Otherwise her score









for S · S
¤ ¡ 1: (5)
Finally let V (S¤) be the investor's expected payo® when the cooperative phase comes to
an halt (S = S¤). In this case the per period expected utility of the investor is the same
as in the equilibrium with short-term trading relationship and it takes T periods before
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TV(0): (6)
The next lemma establishes a useful property of the value function V (:).
Lemma 2 : The value function V(:) decreases with S. Furthermore
V(S + 1) ¡V (S + 2) > V(S) ¡ V(S + 1) for S · S
¤ ¡ 2:
This means that an increase in the investor's score has a negative impact on the value of
her relationship with the dealer. Hence, in the cooperative phase, when the investor is
informed, she faces the following trade-o®. If she refrains from contacting her relationship
dealer, she misses a pro¯t opportunity but she maintains in good stand her relationship
with the dealer (her score is unchanged). If she contacts the dealer and masquerades as
being uninformed, she gets a one-shot large pro¯t (because she trades Q shares at a zero
spread). However her relationship with the dealer is impaired (her score is increased by
one unit) and she expects a lower total payo® from continuation of this relationship. The
loss in the value of her relationship re°ects the fact that (1) a non cooperative phase
becomes more likely when the score is high and (2) risk sharing is less e±cient during non
cooperative phases. The investor is better o® not ripping her relationship dealer o® i®
V(in;S)
| {z }
Informed refrains from trading





which is equivalent (using Equation (4)) to
¯(V(S) ¡ V(S + 1)) ¸ °Q 8S · S
¤ ¡ 1: (7)
This condition means that the investor refrains from using her private information if the
loss in the value of her relationship with the dealer is larger than the immediate gain from
16informed trading. From Lemma 2, we know that V(:) decreases at an increasing rate.
This means that if the previous inequality is satis¯ed for S = 0, then it is satis¯ed for all
S · S¤ ¡ 1. Hence, we can replace the S¤ previous inequalities by the condition
¯(V(0) ¡ V(1)) ¸ °Q: (8)
This condition alone does not guarantee that the investor will not trade when she is
informed. Actually, in this case, the investor may also attempt to manipulate her score.
For instance, assume that the investor has a good signal. If the investor sells the security,
she bears a sure loss (equal to ¡Q). But the dealer books a pro¯t and he re-establishes
the investor's score at zero. The investor is better o® not selling the security in this case
i®
V (in;S) ¸ ¡Q + ¯V(0);
which is equivalent to
¯(V (0) ¡ V(S)) · Q 8S · S
¤ ¡1:
If the previous inequality is satis¯ed for S = S¤ ¡ 1 then it holds true for all lower values
of the score since V (S) decreases with S. Hence,
¯(V(0) ¡ V (S
¤ ¡ 1)) · Q; (9)
is a second necessary condition for the sequence of trading strategies ql to be a best response
for the investor.25 The next lemma summarizes the discussion.
Lemma 3 : The strategy ql is optimal for the investor when the dealer behaves according
to the sequence of pricing rules speci¯ed by pl if and only if
¯(V (0) ¡ V(1)) ¸ °Q; and ¯(V (0) ¡ V(S
¤ ¡1)) · Q:
Furthermore (a) (V(0) ¡ V(1)) decreases with S¤ and increases with T and (b) (V (0) ¡
V(S¤ ¡ 1)) increases with S¤ and T.
The second part of the lemma analyzes the e®ects of a change in the features of the dealer's
scoring strategy on the Incentive Compatibility Constraints (8) and (9). In line with the
intuition, it is easier to discipline the investor when the trigger value of the score is small.
An increase in the length of the non cooperative phase also deters the investor from using
her private information against the dealer. However it increases the investor's incentive to
manipulate the score in order to avoid entering the penalty phase.
25This meansthat without this second condition, thestrategies ql and pl do not constitutean equilibrium.
17It remains to identify the set of parameters for which the two Incentive Compatibility
Constraints hold true. To this end, we compute the value function V(:) for S = 0, S = 1
and S = S¤ ¡1. This is achieved by solving the system of Equations (4), (5) and (6). We
obtain the following result.
Lemma 4 :
1. For given values of the parameters and for a given length of the non-cooperative phase
(T), if a cooperative equilibrium exists for a trigger value S0 > 1 then it must exist
for all the trigger values of the score lower than S0.









c(®;¹;°) ¡ Prob(¢S = +1)°Q); (10)
with Prob(¢S = +1) = Prob(St+1 ¡ St = +1) =
(1¡®)¹
2 .
The ¯rst part of the lemma implies that if a cooperative equilibrium does not exist when
S¤ = 1 then it can not exist for S¤ > 1. Thus we start by studying in details the case in
which the scoring strategy has a trigger value equal to one. The second part of the lemma
is helpful to identify the sets of parameters for which a cooperative equilibrium exists or
does not exist. Notice that, when ¯ goes to 1, the Left Hand Side of Inequality (10) goes
to
°Q
T . It follows that if the Right Hand Side of this equation (which is independent of ¯
and T) is positive then there always exists a pair (¯;T) such that the previous inequality
is satis¯ed. If the R.H.S of this inequality is negative, then it is not possible to induce
cooperation between the investor and the dealer. Actually, in this case, it is not possible
to deter the investor from trading when she is informed, even though (i) the dealer stops
o®ering price improvement very quickly (S¤ = 1), (ii) relationships are expected to last
forever (¯ = 1) and (iii) punishment phases are expected to last forever (T = +1).
Using this remark, the next proposition delineates the set of parameters (®;¹;°) for
which a cooperative equilibrium exists or does not exist.
Proposition 4 :
1. If ° · 3¡
p
5





2 · ° ·
1
2, a cooperative equilibrium can be sustained if and only if ¹ ·
¹nc(®;°).
183. If ° >
1







2® and ¹nc(®;°) is de¯ned in Section 3.
Figure 3 illustrates this proposition. As it can be seen, there are parameters values for
which scoring strategies deter the investor from trading with her relationship dealer when
she is informed. For these parameters, price improvements will be observed in equilibrium.
However, scoring strategies are not always e®ective. The intuition is as follows. Con-
sider an investor in the cooperative phase. The unconditional probability that her score
deteriorates from one period to the next is




This probability decreases with ® and increases with ¹. This means that when ® is small
or ¹ is large, non cooperative phases occur very frequently. This e®ect decreases the long
run payo® the investor expects from adhering to a `no informed trading' commitment.
Accordingly it becomes more di±cult to sustain a cooperative equilibrium. This explains
why, for a given value of °, cooperative equilibria do not exist when ® is small or ¹ is large
(see Figures 3.a) or 3.b)).
It is worth stressing that the e®ect of parameters ® and ¹ are counter-intuitive. One
would expect that it is easy to discipline the investor when she is rarely in possession of
private information (® small) or when she strongly needs to share risk (¹ large). The
opposite result is obtained. Actually, recall that in these two cases, dealer's trading pro¯ts
or losses are poor indicators of the investor's unobserved behavior. Hence scoring strategies
perform badly in disciplining the investor. Finally consider the e®ect of risk aversion (°).
Risk aversion does not a®ect the likelihood of trading pro¯ts (losses) for the dealer. But
risk sharing gains from cooperation are larger as risk aversion increases. Hence the investor
assigns a larger value to her relationship with the dealer. Accordingly, in line with intuition,
the set of parameters for which cooperation arises enlarges when the investor becomes more
risk averse.
Recall that there are parameters' values such that no trading is possible between the
dealer and the investor when their relationship is short term. It is readily checked that,
for these parameters, there always exists a cooperative equilibrium when ° < 1
2.
Corollary 2 : When ° <
1
2, the set of parameters for which a cooperative equilibrium
exists always includes the set of parameters for which a market breakdown occurs in absence
of long-term trading relationships. Furthermore when 3¡
p
5
2 · ° < 1
2, these two sets of
19parameters are identical.
This observation vindicates the view that non-anonymous trading venues, in which traders
can forge long-term trading relationships, sustain trades which could not otherwise occur.
The previous proposition has established that cooperative equilibria exist, at least for
S¤ = 1. When S¤ = 1, the dealer uses quite a harsh rule of behavior since he stops
o®ering price improvement as soon as he experiences a trading loss. This is very e®ective
to discipline the investor but this results in short cooperative phases. In the limit case in







¤ ¸ 1 (11)
which clearly increases in the trigger value of the score (S¤) and decreases in the probability
of a trading loss for the dealer (Prob(¢S = +1)). Intuitively an increase in the expected
length of a cooperative phase results in a larger welfare for the investor (for a given T).
Hence we now consider the existence of scoring strategies with S¤ > 1. We analyze the
welfare gain generated by price improvements in the next subsection. In order to simplify
the analysis, from now on, we focus on the limiting case in which ¯ = 1.26
Proposition 5 : Assume ¯ = 1 and consider values for ®, ¹ and ° such that a coop-
erative equilibrium exists for S¤ = 1. There exists a value S0(®;¹;°) ¸ 2 such that a
cooperative equilibrium with a trigger value equal to S¤ exists if and only if 1 · S¤ · S0.
Furthermore S0 is non increasing with ° and goes to in¯nity when ° goes to zero.
The intuition for this proposition is as follows. When the expected length of a cooperative
phase increases, the investor is more tempted to rip o® the dealer when she is informed,
especially at the beginning of a cooperative phase (recall that V(0)¡V (1) decreases with
S¤). The length of the non-cooperative phase must therefore be increased to maintain in
line the investor's incentives. But then manipulating the score becomes more attractive
(since V(0)¡V (S¤) increases with T). The threshold S0 is such that for a greater trigger
value, it is impossible to simultaneously satisfy the two incentive constraints with an
adequate choice of the length of the penalty phase. Notice that cooperative equilibria
for which S¤ = 2 always exist (when they exist for S¤ = 1) and that cooperative equilibria
with very large trigger values do exist when the investor's risk aversion is small.
Numerical simulations reported in Table 1 illustrate Proposition 5 and the intuition
supporting this proposition. We report the largest possible trigger value of the score for
26Our conclusions would be qualitatively similar when ¯ < 1 and cooperative equilibria exist.
20various levels of risk aversion. For a given trigger value, we de¯ne Tmin(S¤) as the smallest
length of the non cooperative phase such that a cooperative equilibrium exists. As it can be
seen, Tmin(:) increases with S¤, which means that longer cooperative phases are obtained
at the cost of longer non cooperative phases. Furthermore it is clear that the larger is °,
the lower is S0, as stated in the previous proposition. For instance when ° = 0:05, S0 = 5
whereas when ° = 0:2 then S0 = 3. The last row in each table reports the ratio of the
length of a non cooperative phase to the expected length of a cooperative phase. As it can
be seen, this ratio increases as the investor becomes less risk averse for all feasible trigger
values of the scoring strategies.
Remark.
In equilibrium, in cooperative phases, the investor does not trade when she is informed.
So why do we need non cooperative phases? After all, in case of an outcome triggering a
non cooperative period, the dealer and the investor could mutually agree on maintaining
their cooperation. In such a case, however, the Incentive Compatibility Constraints can
not be satis¯ed. Hence the prospect of non-cooperative phases are necessary to discipline
the investor.
4.3 Price Improvements and Welfare
Consider (1 ¡ ¯)V(0), the average `per period' ex-ante expected utility27 obtained by the
investor when her score is equal to zero in a cooperative equilibrium. We compare this
measure of the investor's welfare in a cooperative equilibrium to the ex-ante expected
utility for the investor when she and the dealer do not cooperate. Recall that in this case
there are multiple equilibria but that the investor's welfare is maximum in the equilibrium
described in Proposition 2. Therefore we take the welfare level obtained in this equilibrium
as our benchmark. We obtain the following result.














Hence a cooperative equilibrium always Pareto-dominates an equilibrium obtained with
short-term trading relationships but it never achieves the welfare level associated with a
`no informed trading' commitment.
27Actually this is the total expected payo® (V(0)) divided by the expected length of the relationship.
21Notice that WI is a measure of the welfare improvement associated with a given scoring
strategy, normalized by the welfare improvement that could be obtained if a no informed
trading commitment were credible (the largest possible Pareto improvement).
In cooperative phases, trades and prices are as when the investor can enter into a
no informed trading commitment. The resulting allocations are clearly Pareto e±cient.
However, the probability of entering into a non cooperative phase is never zero. In these
phases, the per period expected utility of the investor is not improved compared to the
equilibrium with short-term trading relationships. It follows that the welfare improvement
in a cooperative equilibrium is always positive but smaller than what could be obtained
with the `no informed trading' commitment or
0 < WI < 100%:
As shown by Equation (12), the welfare gains associated with scoring strategies crucially
depends on the ratio of the length of the non cooperative phase to the expected length
of the cooperative phase, R(S¤;T) = T=L(S¤). The larger is this ratio, the lower is the
welfare gain brought up by scoring strategies because non cooperative phases occur more
frequently and last longer. The largest welfare improvement can be obtained by choosing
T and S¤ so as to maximize R(T;S¤) under the Incentive Compatibility Constraints.
It is di±cult to provide closed-form solution for this maximization problem.28 Table
2 provides numerical simulations. We report for di®erent values of (°;¹;®), the largest
welfare improvement that can be obtained with scoring strategies. Two conclusions emerge.
1. For a given level of risk aversion, the e±ciency of scoring strategies is small when ® is
small or ¹ is large. This re°ects the fact that in these cases, trading losses are more
frequent for the dealer and accordingly the expected length of cooperative phases is
lower (see Equation (11)).
2. For given values of ¹ and ®, the e±ciency of scoring strategies increases when the
investor's risk aversion enlarges (° decreases). Actually, the larger is the investor's
risk aversion, the larger is the cost of impairing her relationship with the dealer (since
she bene¯ts a lot from being able to share risk). Hence it becomes easier to discipline
the investor and cooperative equilibria are sustained for lower values of R (that is
a lower length for the non cooperative phase and/or a larger trigger value for the
score). See Table 1 (last rows) for a numerical illustration.
28The di±culty is that T and S¤ must be integer. Simulations suggest that this constraint has a non
trivial impact on the welfare gain that can be obtained.
22Overall the results of this section suggest that the e±ciency and success of scoring strate-
gies depend on the investor's characteristics (® and °). Traders with high risk aversion
or a high probability of being informed will get larger bene¯t from establishing long-term
trading relationships.
5 Robustness and Implications of the Analysis
5.1 Robustness
Multiple trading opportunities.
Until this point, we have assumed that the investor had no other choice than to trade
with her relationship dealer. In reality, of course, the investor has other ways to carry her
trades.29 A natural question is how these additional trading opportunities would a®ect the
analysis.
First consider a period in which the investor is informed. Let assume that the investor
can garner a total expected pro¯t ¦¤ from informed trades with all possible counter-parts.
If the investor does not trade with her relationship dealer, she loses a pro¯t opportunity but
she does not give up the possibility to conduct trades with other counter-parts. Hence her
total expected trading pro¯t is (¦¤¡°Q) when she refrains from trading with her relation-
ship dealer. Accordingly the opportunity cost of the `no informed trading' commitment
with her relationship dealer remains °Q and (qualitatively) the incentive compatibility
constraints which must be satis¯ed when the investor is informed are unchanged. In non-
cooperative phases, multiple trading opportunities may allow the investor to hedge more
e®ectively than with her relationship dealer.30 In this case, the `cost' of entering into a
non cooperative phase is lower for the investor (that is V(S¤) is larger in our analysis) and
scoring strategies will be less able to discipline the investor.
Accordingly multiple trading opportunities may reduce the set of parameters for which
cooperative equilibria can be sustained. However, scoring strategies will still be able to
29For instance, several dealers usually supply liquidity for each stock in the London Stock Exchange or
on Nasdaq. In some cases, traders can also trade the same stock in di®erent trading venues. This is the
case in Germany for instance where traders can choose to trade, non anonymously, with a single dealer
(the specialist) or anonymously in an electronic trading system (Xetra).
30For instance, suppose that the investor can trade non-anonymously with her relationship dealer or
anonymously in an electronic trading system. In cooperative phases, the investor hedges perfectly with
her relationship dealer and she can not expect better terms if she trades anonymously. In non cooperative
phases, this is not necessarily the case. For instance, she may reduce her trading cost by placing a sequence
of small orders in the anonymous trading system.
23discipline some investors as long as prices received in non cooperative phases are worst
than the prices o®ered by the relationship dealer in cooperative phases (i.e. as long as
entering the non cooperative phase is costly).
Switching dealers.
An investor could try to escape punishment by switching to another dealer at the end
of a cooperative phase. Notice that this is optimal for the investor only if she expects to
enter into a cooperative phase with her new relationship dealer more rapidly than with the
initial dealer. If this is the case then cooperative equilibria can not be sustained. However,
there are several reasons for which switching from one dealer to another should be costly
when dealers use scoring strategies.
First, notice that, in cooperative phases, an investor has an incentive to contact a dealer
di®erent from her relationship dealer only if she is informed. Accordingly non-relationship
dealers should start by o®ering very bad prices to unknown investors.31 Hence switching
dealer should certainly not be without costs. Second theability to screen informed from non
informed investors constitute a competitive advantage for the dealership market compared
to more anonymous trading venues. Accordingly the community of dealers should seek
to enforce a code of conduct which preserves this competitive advantage. For instance,
dealers may customarily wait several rounds before o®ering price improvements to a new
client. In order to enforce this convention, each dealer can threaten his competitors from
also shortening `observation periods' if they were to do so.
Rents for the relationship dealer.
For simplicity we have assumed that the relationship dealer o®ers competitive prices.
In practice however the arrangements we described in the previous section may allow
the dealer to extract rents from their regular clients. Actually, as we just explained,
these arrangements create switching costs for the investor and therefore soften competition
between dealers. The previous results however still hold true when the dealer charges a
non competitive price during cooperative phases.
To see this point assume that the dealer charges a spread equal to sc during cooperative
phases, with with 0 < sc < snc. Obviously, the dealer must choose sc small enough for the
investor to be better o® trading during the cooperative phases. In this case, the optimal
trade size for the investor is then qc =
Q
1+sc.32 We maintain the assumption that the
31A similar problem arises in the literature on relationship banking when only defaulting ¯rms have an
incentive to switch banks (see Sharpe (1991)).
32We derive the investor's optimal trade size given the spread charged by the dealer in the proof of
Proposition 1.
24dealer charges the competitive spread, snc, during non cooperative periods. Computations
(available upon request) show that a necessary and su±cient condition for the existence
of a cooperative equilibrium is
¢U
c(s
c) ¡ Prob(¢S = +1)°
Q(1 ¡ sc)





where ¢Uc(sc) = ¢Uc(®;°;¹) ¡
(1¡®)scQ
1+sc . This condition is simply the generalization of
Condition (10) when the dealer behaves non competitively in cooperative periods (the two
conditions coincide for sc = 0). In particular ¢Uc(sc) is the per period di®erence between
the investor's expected utilities in cooperative phases and in non cooperative phases and
Q(1¡s)
1+s is the investor's pro¯t if she exploits her private information against her relationship
dealer during the cooperative phase.
Now consider values of the parameters (®;¹;°) such that Condition (10) holds true. By
continuity, it is clear that the dealer can always choose a spread sc su±ciently small so
that Condition (13) is satis¯ed as well. Hence allowing the dealer to earn rents does not
shrink the set of parameters for which cooperative equilibria exist. Now consider values of
the parameters (®;¹;°) such that there are no cooperative equilibria when the dealer is
competitive (sc = 0). Recall that for these parameters the Left hand Side of Condition (13)
is negative when sc = 0. Computations show that the Left Hand Side of Condition (13)
decreases with sc. Hence an increase in the spread does not enlarge the set of parameters
for which cooperative equilibria exist.
To sum up, the sets of parameters for which cooperative equilibria exist and do not
exist do not depend on the possibility of earning rents for the dealer. Of course, when
the dealer is non competitive, the welfare gain from cooperation for the investor is lower
but still positive. As for the dealer, he is strictly better o® in cooperative equilibria than
in non-cooperative equilibria since only in the ¯rst case he can extract rents from the
investor. This gives another reason to the community of dealers to organize in such a way
that investors do not switch dealers to avoid penalty phases.
Other scoring strategies.
Recall that when the dealer makes an unexpected pro¯t, he reinstates the investor's
score at zero during cooperative phases. There are of course other possibilities. We have
analyzed the case in which the dealer leaves the investor's score unchanged, for instance.
The sets of parameters for which cooperative equilibria exist and do not exist with this
scoring strategy and the strategy considered so far are identical. The welfare properties of
the scoring strategies are di®erent, however. For identical values of the trigger value and
the length of the non-cooperative phase, the welfare gains for the investor are larger with
25the scoring strategy described in Section 4. The reason is that the likelihood of entering
a non cooperative phase is much lower with this scoring strategy. Hence one advantage
of the scoring strategy we have considered in this paper is that it helps to maintain the
relationship in cooperative phases during a very long time.
`No bagging' commitment.
Seppi (1990) studies the trading of blocks of shares. In the NYSE, traders can choose
to trade a block `downstairs' (in an anonymous way) or `upstairs' (non anonymously). In
Seppi's model, if she trades upstairs, an investor must commit not to re trade after the
initial block trade (`no bagging' commitment).33 This commitment is costly when the
investor is informed since she gives up the possibility to conduct several informed trades.
Accordingly Seppi (1990) shows that there are equilibria in which only uninformed agents
trade upstairs.
Our analysis does not rely on `no bagging' commitments. As explained previously, in
equilibrium, the investor optimally refrains from trading with her relationship dealer but
she retains the freedom of conducting trades with other counter-parts.
5.2 Empirical Implications
The previous analysis has some implications that can be useful for empirical investigations.
Our results concur with a basic prediction of the extant literature on non anonymous mar-
kets. In these markets, some traders must be able to negotiate price improvements.34
The novelty here is that price improvements are part of an incentive mechanism which in-
duces investors to refrain from ripping o® their relationship dealer when they are informed.
This makes our explanation of this phenomenon distinct from the explanation provided by
Bernhardt et al. (1999) or Rhodes-Kropf (1998).
Our main predictions regard the relationship between price improvements and each
individual investors' trading history. First the model predicts that a given trader should
not constantly receive price improvements from a given dealer. Hence for a given trader,
the size of price improvements should vary over time, even after controlling for trade
size. Second, according to the model, phases in which the investor do not receive price
improvements should be observed after a sequence of suspicious trades. Suspicious trades
33Seppi (1990) assumes that violations of this commitment are observable and can therefore be deterred
with su±ciently large penalties.
34In practice, the price improvement can be measured relative to the quotes posted by the dealer just
before the transaction or relative to the best quotes posted in a competing, anonymous, trading system.
26are either a purchasefollowed by a price increaseor a sale followed by a price decrease. More
generally this result suggests to consider the frequency of suspicious trades by investors.
Those who conduct suspicious trades more frequently should receive price improvements
less frequently.
6 Conclusions
In this article we have studied a speci¯c pricing policy by which a dealer induces his
regular clients to refrain from trading when they have private information. This pricing
policy consists in o®ering price improvements to traders who do not repeatedly in°ict
losses to the dealer and to stop o®ering these improvements otherwise. Hence our model
o®ers an explanation for why price improvements are a pervasive phenomenon in dealership
markets (e.g. the London Stock Exchange or Nasdaq). In our model, the prospect of losing
price improvements deters investors from ripping o® their regular dealer when they are
informed. In turn, this behavior enables the dealer to o®er price improvements without
losing money. Our explanation for price improvements does not rely on excess pro¯ts
for the dealers or on dealers' ability to distinguish informed and non informed traders.35
Rather price improvements are part of an incentive mechanism which induces investors to
honor a `no-informed trading' commitment.
Furthermore we assess the bene¯ts of long-term trading relationships. First we show
that they can e®ectively remedy no trading outcomes due to adverse selection. Second
we show that the ability to forge long-term trading relationships can generate substantial
welfare gains, for traders with large risk aversions or/and a large probability of being
informed. In our model, the investor conducts her liquidity trades with the relationship
dealer. She should trade with other counter parties when she has private information. This
suggests that when an anonymous and a non anonymous trading system co-exist, long term
trading relationships in the non anonymous system will exacerbate adverse selection in the
parallel trading system. In this case, the welfare gains for traders engaged in long term
relationships may obtain at the expense of traders who only have access to the anonymous
trading system (or for whom cooperative equilibria can not be sustained). This issue is an
interesting topic for future research.
35We assume that the dealer never observes the investor's trading motive.
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298 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Clearly, the price posted by the dealer must belong to [v0 ¡
1;v0 + 1]. Hence an investor with type µ3 (µ4) never submits an order to buy (sell) the
asset. It follows that, in any equilibria, the dealer must accommodate sell orders (resp.
buy orders) at a discount (resp. at a markup) relative to v0. For this reason, in any
equilibria, a trader with type µ2 (resp. µ1) never submits a sell order (resp. a buy order).
Actually this would reinforce the investor's risk exposure without compensation for risk
taking. Finally it is straightforward that, in equilibrium, when she has type µ3 the investor
must submit the same sell order as when she has type µ1. Actually this is the only way for










In equilibrium, the dealer's bidding rule is competitive. Hence, when qsell > 0,
p(q
sell) = E(~ v j q
¤(µ) = ¡q
sell) = E(~ v j µ 2 fµ3;µ1g) = v0 ¡ s
nc;
where snc is as de¯ned in Lemma 1. In the same way, when qbuy > 0,
p(q
buy) = E(~ v j q
¤(µ) = q
buy) = E(~ v j µ 2 fµ4;µ2g) = v0 + s
nc:
Proof of Proposition 1. We de¯ne
¹ °(s;¹)
def =





The next lemma gives the investor's demand (supply) function when she has type µ2 (µ1)
at a price larger (lower) than v0. The lemma is used to prove the results which appear in
Propositions 1 and 2.
Lemma 5 : For s 2 [0;1),
1. The demand of an investor with type µ2 at a price p = v0 + s is db(v0 + s;µ2) =
Q
1+s
if ° < ¹ °(s;¹) and zero if ° ¸ ¹ °(s;¹).
2. The supply of an investor with type µ1 at a price p = v0 ¡ s is ds(v0 ¡s;µ1) = ¡
Q
1+s
if ° < ¹ °(s;¹) and zero if ° ¸ ¹ °(s;¹).
30Proof: The ¯nal wealth of the investor when she has type µ2 and purchases d shares of
the security at price p = v0 + s is
1. WU(d) = ¡Q + d(v0 + 1 ¡ p(µ2)) = ¡Q + d(1 ¡ s) if ² = +1,
2. W0(d) = d(v0 ¡ p(µ2)) = ¡ds if ² = 0,
3. WD(d) = Q + d(v0 ¡ 1 ¡p(µ2)) = Q¡ d(1 + s) if ² = ¡1,
with d ¸ 0. Notice that W0(d) · 0. Furthermore WU(d) · 0 if and only if d ·
Q
1¡s and
WD(d) · 0 if and only if d ¸
Q
1+s. Notice that s 2 [0;1) so that 1=(1+s) · 1=(1¡s). Now




























is the optimal trade size for the investor. If ° ¸ ¹ °(s;¹) then
@E(U( ~ W(d))
@d
· 0 8d ¸ 0:
It follows that the investor's demand at price p = v0 + s is db(v0 + s;µ2) = 0. The same
argument can be used to derive the supply function of the investor when she has type µ1.
Notice that
¹ °(®;¹) = ¹ °(s
nc;¹):
Consider an investor with type µ1. We know from Lemma 1 that, in equilibrium, (a) an
investor with type µ1 sells the security or does nothing and that (b) in any equilibria in
which the investor sells the amount qsell, the price charged by the dealer for this order is
p(¡qsell) = v0 ¡snc. But when the dealer charges this price, the investor's optimal supply
when she has type µ1 is zero if ° ¸ ¹ °(snc;¹) (see Lemma 5). It follows that the investor
is better o® not contacting her relationship dealer. This implies that when ° ¸ ¹ °(snc;¹),








is the unique possibility when ° ¸ ¹ °(®;¹).
Proof of Corollary 1. There is no market breakdown i®
° < ¹ °(®;¹):






















is a necessary and su±cient condition for the absence of market breakdown.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Step 1. We ¯rst show that the case in which the investor's trade size is qnc is a possible
equilibrium outcome. Recall that ¹ °(®;¹) = ¹ °(snc;¹): Consider an investor with type µ2.
It is clearly not optimal for this investor to sell the security at a price below v0 (this would
reinforce her exposure to risk without any compensation). Thus she should buy shares
or abstain from contacting her relationship dealer. The investor is better o® buying qnc





is the investor's optimal demand at price v0 + snc since ° < ¹ °(snc;¹) (see Lemma 5). At
the other prices, the investor's demand is zero. Hence the investor chooses to buy qnc.
In the same way, we show that an investor with type µ1 chooses to sell qnc. Trades sizes
di®erent from qnc have a probability zero to be observed in equilibrium. Consequently, for
these trade sizes, the dealer's beliefs regarding the investor type can not be computed by
Bayes rule. In this case we are free to let the dealer have any beliefs. We suppose that
32the dealer believes the investor to have type µ3 (µ4) when the latter wants to sell (buy)
a quantity q 6 = qnc. This yields the dealer's o®er for q 6 = qnc.The rest of the proposition
follows from Lemma 1.
Step 2. Now we show that the investor's ex-ante expected utility is maximum when
her trade size is equal to qnc. Let ¹ U(q¤(µ)) be the investor's expected utility when she
uses the trading strategy q¤(:) and her type is µ. We de¯ne f(q1;q2) = Eµ(¹ U(q¤(~ µ)); the
investor's ex-ante expected utility in an equilibrium in which q¤(µ1) = q¤(µ3) = q1 < 0 and
q¤(µ2) = q¤(µ4) = q2 > 0. We show below that f(:;:) reaches its maximum when q1 = ¡qnc
and q2 = qnc. For this we compute Eµ(¹ U(t¤(~ µ)) as a function of q1 and q2 when the price
at which the investor sells q1 is v0 ¡ snc and the price at which she buys q2 is v0 + snc
(since these are the equilibrium prices in any equilibria). The proof relies on the fact that
qnc is the trade size which maximizes the investor's expected utility when the investor is
non-informed and the dealer charges a spread equal to snc (see Lemma 5 in the proof of
Proposition 2).
First suppose that q2 < qnc. Notice that
Eµ(¹ U(q









Clearly this expression does not depend on q1. It is straightforward that ¹ U(q¤(µ4)) increases
with q2 (when she is informed, the investor prefers to trade the largest possible quantity).
Since ° < ¹ °(®;¹) and q2 < qnc, we also obtain that ¹ U(q¤(µ2)) increases with q2 (Lemma
5). It follows that
Eµ(¹ U(q
¤(~ µ)) j µ 2 fµ2;µ4g) £ Prob(µ 2 fµ2;µ4g);
increases with q2. In the same way we show that
Eµ(¹ U(q
¤(~ µ)) j µ 2 fµ1;µ3g) £ Prob(µ 2 fµ1;µ3g);
increases with q1 for q1 < qnc. As
f(q1;q2) = Eµ(¹ U(q
¤) j µ 2 fµ2;µ4g)Prob(µ 2 fµ2;µ4g)+Eµ(¹ U(q
¤) j µ 2 fµ1;µ3g)Prob(µ 2 fµ1;µ3g);
we have shown that
@f(:;q2)
@q1





> 0 for q2 < q
nc: (15)
33Now suppose that q2 > qnc. We obtain (after some algebra) that













2 if q2 >
Q
1¡snc
Recall that ° < 1 and snc < 1. Thus
Eµ(¹ U(q
¤(~ µ)) j µ 2 fµ2;µ4g)Prob(µ 2 fµ2;µ4g);
decreases with q2 for q2 > qnc. In the same way we show that
Eµ(¹ U(q
¤)(~ µ) j µ 2 fµ1;µ3g)Prob(µ 2 fµ1;µ3g);
decreases with q1 for q1 > qnc. Hence
@f(:;q2)
@q1





< 0 for q2 > q
nc: (17)
It follows from Equations (14), (15), (16), (17) that f(:;:) reaches its maximum for q1 =
¡qnc and q2 = qnc.
Proof of Proposition 3. It is straightforward to compute the investor's ex-ante
expected utility when she uses the non-cooperative trading strategy, qnc(:)). The result
follows.






V (S ¡ 1) for 1 · S · S
¤:
Substituting V (he;S ¡ 1) by this expression in Equation (5) and rearranging, we obtain








. Using this equation and proceeding recursively, we can write V (S)
as a function of V(0). We obtain
V(S) =
2







5V(0) for 1 · S · S
¤: (18)
34First notice that the total expected payo® of the investor can not be larger than her
expected payo® when she is able to commit not to trade on her private information. The
latter is zero, which implies that V(0) · 0. Second notice that the term in bracket in
Equation (18) increases with S. It follows that V(S) decreases with S. Using Equation
(18), we also obtain
V(S + 1) ¡ V(S + 2) = k (V(S) ¡ V(S + 1));
and since k > 1
V (S + 1) ¡ V(S + 2) > V(S) ¡ V(S + 1):
This achieves the proof.







nc(~ µ))) + ¯
TV(0):
It follows from Equation (18) that
2











nc(~ µ))) + ¯
TV(0):
Solving this equation for V(0), we obtain that
V(0) =
(1 ¡ ¯T)E(¹ U(qnc(~ µ)))
(1 ¡ ¯)[
2(1¡¯)





Proof of Lemma 3.
Part 1.
According to the Optimality Principle of Dynamic Programming, the investor has no
incentive to deviate from the trading strategy ql i® there is no circumstances in which a
one shot deviation is pro¯table. Hence, we just need to identify conditions under which
a one shot deviation from the trading strategy ql(:) is non optimal for the investor, in a
cooperative phase or in a non cooperative phase. Thus we proceed in two steps.
Step 1. In the cooperative phase.
For each possible value of S · S¤ ¡ 1, three types of deviations are possible.
1. The investor is informed and she has good (bad) information. She buys (sells) the
35security (instead of not trading).
2. The investor is informed and she has good (bad) information. She sells (buy) the
security (instead of not trading).
3. The investor is uninformed and she does not contact the dealer.
We consider each of these deviations in turn. We have already explained in the text that
the ¯rst and the second deviations are not optimal i®
¯(V(0) ¡ V(1)) ¸ °Q; (20)
and
¯(V(0) ¡ V (S
¤ ¡ 1)) · Q: (21)
Now consider the case in which the investor is uninformed. When she has score S · S¤¡1,
the investor is better o® trading i®
¹ U
r




2 < 0 is the investor's expected utility when she has a hedging need and






(V(S + 1) + V (0) ¡ 2V (S)):








(f(S + 1) ¡2f(S)): (23)
Notice that
2f(S) · kf(S) < f(S + 1);
since k ¸ 2. Hence the R.H.S of Condition (23) is positive. Since Ur
h < 0, this condition
holds true. Hence Conditions (20) and (21) are necessary and su±cient for ql to be a best
response for the investor in the cooperative phase.
Step 2. Non Cooperative Phase.
In the non cooperative phase, the dealer's pricing rule not in°uenced by past outcomes.
Therefore, the investor must act as if her relationship with the dealer were short term. It
follows that the non cooperative strategy is optimal for the investor in the non cooperative
phase.
36Part 2
Using Equation (18), we ¯nd that
V(0) ¡ V(S) =
¡2(1 ¡ ¯)f(S)
(1 ¡ ®)¯¹




j=0 kj. It is immediate that (¡V(0)) increases with T (using Equation
(19) and the fact that
1¡¯
1¡¯T decreases with T). It follows that V(0)¡V(S) increases with
T for all S · S¤¡1. Substituting V (0) by its expression given in Equation (19), we obtain
V(0) ¡ V(S) =
2
4 (1 ¡ ¯T)f(S)










Using this equation, it is immediate that V (0) ¡ V(1) decreases with S¤ (because f(S¤)
increases with S¤). Long but simple computations show that
f(S¤)
f(S¤¡1) decreases with S¤. It
follows that V(0) ¡ V (S¤ ¡ 1) increases with S¤.
Proof of Lemma 4.
First Part.
Fix the length of the non-cooperative phase. From Lemma 3, we know that (a) (V (0) ¡
V(1)) decreases with S¤ and that b) (V(0)¡V (S¤¡1)) increases with S¤. Hence if Equa-
tions (8) and (9) are satis¯ed for S¤ = S0 > 1 then they are satis¯ed for any S¤ lower than
S0 and larger than or equal to 1.
Second Part
For S¤ = 1, Condition (9) is always satis¯ed. Recall that ¢Uc(®;¹;°) = ¡E(¹ U(qnc(~ µ)))
(see Proposition 3). Using this remark and Equation (24) written for S = S¤, we obtain









The second part is obtained by writing Equation (25) for S¤ = 1 (recall that f(1) = 1).
Proof of Proposition 4. The discussion which precedes the proposition implies
that
¢U
c ¡ Prob(¢S = +1)°Q ¸ 0; (26)
is a necessary and su±cient condition for the existence of a cooperative equilibrium. Recall
37from Proposition 3 that
¢U
c(®;¹;°) =
®(1 ¡ ®)¹(1 ¡ °)
2¹® + (1 ¡®)





(1 ¡ ®)¹(1 ¡ °)
2
Q if ¹ · ¹
nc(®;°):
We have used the fact that ° < ¹ ° is equivalent to ¹ > ¹nc(®;°), see the proof of Corollary
1. It follows that if ¹ > ¹nc(®;°), Equation(26) can be written as
®(1 ¡®)¹











2¹® + (1 ¡ ®)
[¹
c(®;°) ¡ ¹] ¸ 0: (27)














. This is the value of ® such that ¹c(®;°) = 0.




2 and ® < ®0(°). In this case, ¹c(®;°) < 0 and ¹nc(®;°) = 0. Hence
¹ > ¹nc > ¹c. Thus the existence condition is given by Equation (27) but it can not be
satis¯ed since ¹ > 0 > ¹c. We deduce that there is no value of ¹ such that cooperation is
possible in this case.








Case 2.1: Suppose that
¹
nc(®;°) · ¹ · ¹
c(®;°):
In this case, the existence condition is given by Equation (27). Since 0 < ¹ · ¹c, the
L.H.S of this equation is strictly positive and an equilibrium with cooperation exists.
Case 2.2: Now suppose that 0 · ¹ · ¹nc(®;°). In this case the existence condition is
given by Equation (28). The L.H.S of this equation is positive i® ° · 1
2 and ¹ ¸ 0. The




2. Hence, combining Cases 1 and 2, we have
38shown that
0 < ¹ · ¹
c(®;°);









2 < ° · 1




If ¹ > ¹nc(®;°), the incentive compatibility condition can not be satis¯ed (same reasoning
as in Case 1). If ¹ < ¹nc, the existence condition is always satis¯ed (same reasoning as in
Case 2.2.).
Case 4. ° >
1
2. We follow the same steps as in the previous case. the only di®erence is
that even when ¹ < ¹nc, the incentive compatibility condition can not be satis¯ed.





2 , a cooperative equilibrium exists if an only if 0 < ¹ < ¹c(®;°). In this
case, ¹nc(®;°) < ¹c(®;°). Hence the set of parameters for which a market breakdown




2 < ° · 1
2, a cooperative equilibrium exists i® ¹ < ¹nc. Hence the set of parameters
for which a market breakdown occurs and the set of parameters for which a cooperative
equilibrium exists are identical.
Proof of Proposition 5. For ¯ = 1, using Equation (24), we can write Conditions




















Consider values of ®,¹ and ° such that the L.H.S of Equation (29) is positive, that is such
that a cooperative equilibrium exists when S¤ = 1.
Step 1.
We ¯rst show that for S¤ = 2, there is also a cooperative equilibrium. For S¤ = 2, since




39It turns out that this is always larger than the L.H.S of Condition (30). We deduce that
Condition (30) holds true for S¤ = 2. Furthermore, there always exists a value of T
su±ciently large such that Condition (29) holds true as well. This shows that if there
exists a cooperative equilibrium when S¤ = 1 then there exists a cooperative equilibrium
for S¤ = 2.
Step 2.
For a given S¤, Condition (29) holds true for a su±ciently large value of T. Let Tmin(S¤)
be the smallest value of T such that the condition is satis¯ed. Clearly Tmin(S¤) is non




Now consider Condition (30). The R.H.S of this condition decreases with T. Let Tmax(S¤)
be the largest value of T for which the condition holds true. If there is no value of T larger
than or equal to 1 such that the condition is satis¯ed, we set T max = 0. As the R.H.S
of Condition (30) decreases with S¤, Tmax is non-increasing with S¤. From Step 1, we








Clearly this function is positive for S¤ = 2 and negative for S¤ su±ciently large. As H(:)














Hence for S · S0, we can ¯nd a value of T such that the two incentive compatibility
constraints are satis¯ed whereas this is impossible for S > S0.
Step 3. It is possible to show that a lower bound for S0 is the largest integer Sl(°) such
that
f(S




and that an upper bound for S0 is the largest integer Su(°) such that
f(S




We omit the proof of this result for brevity. Recall that f(:) is strictly increasing with
S. Hence the upper bound for S0 decreases with ° which shows that S0 is non increasing
40with °. Furthermore as ° goes to zero, Sl(°) goes to in¯nity which shows that S0 becomes
in¯nitely large when ° goes to zero. This proves the last part of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 6. Recall that ¢Uc = ¡E(¹ U(qnc)). Using Equation (19), we
obtain






Now recall that f(S¤) =
Pj=S¤¡1
j=0 2j when ¯ = 1. Hence using Equation (11)), the previous
equation becomes






It follows (after some manipulations) that
lim¯!1










Using this expression, it is immediate that






This implies that, in a cooperative equilibrium, the investor gets a larger per period ex-
pected utility (on average) than the largest per period expected utility she can obtain with
short term trading relationships. The dealer's expected pro¯t is unchanged. Hence, for
given parameters, a cooperative equilibrium Pareto-dominates the equilibria with short
term trading relationships. Finally note that the previous equation also implies that







or the welfare gain in a cooperative equilibrium is lower than with a no-informed trading
commitment.
41Table 1 : Cooperative Equilibria with Trigger Values Larger Than One.
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Parameters Values : Q =10,000, m = ½, a = 1/3, b=1
__________________________________________________________________________________________
g= 0.05
S* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Cooperative Equilibrium exists Y Y Y Y Y
T
min(S*) 1 2 4 8 16
R 0.16 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.08
g= 0.1
S* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Cooperative Equilibrium exists Y Y Y Y
T
min(S*) 2 4 5 18
R 0.33 0.22 0.21 0.21
g= 0.15
S* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Cooperative Equilibrium exists Y Y Y
T
min(S*) 3 7 16
R 0.5 0.38 0.38
g= 0.2
S* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Cooperative Equilibrium exists Y Y Y
T
min(S*) 4 11 26
R 0.66 0.61 0.61
Table 1 provides for different values of the risk aversion coefficient : (i) the set of trigger
values for which a cooperative equilibrium exists, (ii) the smallest possible length of the non
cooperative phase (T
min(S
*)) for each trigger value and (3) the ratio of the length of the non




Cooperative equilibria do not exist for trigger values corresponding to grey cells.Table 2 : Efficiency of Scoring Strategies
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Parameters Values : Q =10,000, b=1
__________________________________________________________________________________________
g= 0.1
m/a 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
0.1 48.85% 85.83% 88.88% 88.88% 88.88%
0.3 46.66% 87.74% 88.75% 88.6% 88.86%
0.5 44.37% 81.08% 88.88% 88.88% 88.88%
0.7 41.91% 78.26% 85.95% 88.88% 88.88%
0.9 39.93% 76.04% 83.83% 87.41% 88.88%
 
g= 0.2
m/a 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
0.1 68.25% 75% 74.94% 75%
0.3 63.09% 74.4% 74.94% 74.94%
0.5 57.97% 75% 74.4% 75%
0.7 53.33% 74.07% 74.34% 74.9%
0.9 46.4% 64.06% 74.23% 74.94%
g= 0.3
m/a 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
0.1 57.14% 57.14% 57.14% 57.14%
0.3 37.10% 57.14% 57.14% 57.14%
0.5 28.57% 57.14% 57.14% 57.14%
0.7 19.99% 57.14% 57.14% 57.14%
0.9 11.4% 57.14% 57.14% 57.14%
g= 0.4
m/a 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
0.1 33.25% 33.3% 33.33% 33.33%
0.3 33% 33.3% 33.22% 33.33%
0.5 32.87% 33.3% 33.3% 33.33%
0.7 32.87% 33% 33.25%
0.9 33.05% 33.05% 33.22%
Table 2 provides the largest welfare improvement that can be obtained with scoring strategies
for different values of a, m and g. The welfare improvement is expressed as a percentage of
the welfare improvement that would be obtained with a ‘no informed trading’ commitment.




The investor chooses her trade
size, q. If q=0, she does not
contact her regular dealer
The dealer posts
a price, p, at which
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